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American Judicial Rejectionism and the Domestic
Court’s Undermining of International Human Rights
Law and Policy After Human Right Violations Have
Occurred in the State
Jessika L. Gonzalez†
Abstract: Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd’s
executions ignited protests across the world. These protests raised debate over
the United States Supreme Court’s creation of qualified immunity for police
misconduct. This in turn creates an appropriate opportunity to stop and take
stock of United States law surrounding protections and immunities afforded to
law enforcement officials, relative to international law and policy on law
enforcement accountability and oversight. In doing so, this article uncovers how
the American judiciary carries out a new form of American rejectionism
powered by its use of qualified immunity doctrine, which in practice, results in
a lack of accountability for law enforcement officials. This effectively
undermines international human rights law ratified by the State such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (UNCAT), and the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Form of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The State judiciary’s exercise of
qualified immunity doctrine also dismisses international policy developed by
international organizations like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC). The issue is unsettling for two reasons: (1) it effectively nullifies
the treaty making process and (2) perpetuates a system where domestic courts
are not accountable to international law ratified and enforced by the nation’s
other two branches of government. This article proposes a new approach to this
area of the law: reforming Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
(RUDs) so as to not limit treaties’ domestic effect within the State’s judicial
system and instilling within it greater and more principled acceptance of
international legal norms.
Cite as: Jessika L. Gonzalez, American Judicial Rejectionism and the
Domestic Court’s Undermining of International Human Rights Law and Policy
After Human Right Violations Have Occurred in the State, 30 WASH. INT’L L.J.
397 (2021).

INTRODUCTION
The execution of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George
Floyd has inspired people across the globe to call attention to laws that
have consistently protected law enforcement officials and authorized
them to act with absolute impunity. Such laws appropriately examined
in this context have included the United States Supreme Court’s creation
of qualified immunity for police misconduct.1 In examining for the first
†
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398

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 2

time how United States’ law surrounding protections and immunities
afforded to law enforcement officials square with international law and
policy on law enforcement accountability and oversight, this article
uncovers how the United States’ highest court carries out an explicit
form of American rejectionism powered by and through the continual
use of the qualified immunity doctrine.
Internationally prescribed law and policy is undermined or
rejected when judiciaries—like in the United States—develop legal
doctrines akin to that of qualified immunity. The doctrine protects a law
enforcement official from being held personally liable for human rights
violations, so long as the official does not violate clearly established law.
This in turn allows police officers to escape accountability.
International human rights law ratified by the United States sets
out legal standards on the fundamental rights entitled to individuals in
the context of policing. Practical guidance is also developed by
international organizations to support States,2 like the United States, in
an endeavor to provide transparency, accountability, and police
oversight, through disciplinary proceedings against law enforcement
officials. Despite these legal obligations and guidance, the United States’
Supreme Court stays firm and determined in their dismissal of
international law and policy. This attitude threatens to delegitimize the
treaty making process and perpetuates a system where State domestic
court systems are not accountable to international law ratified by the
State where the domestic courts sit.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief
introduction to the qualified immunity doctrine, following its evolution
before discussing how its evolved presence in the United States today
results in a lack of accountability for law enforcement officials. Part II
unpacks three international treaties undermined by the qualified
immunity doctrine, while also discussing international standards that
detail and put forth guidance for a more transparent and accountable
State policing model. Part III illustrates how the United States’ qualified
immunity doctrine undermines international law and policy and explains
why this is of notable importance. A brief Part IV recommends solutions
to improve the United States’ domestic court policy on this front. Among
these solutions are reforming Reservations, Understandings, and
Declarations (“RUDs”) so as to not restrict the domestic effect treaties

would also like to thank the Editorial Staff at Washington International Law Journal for
their hard work, insightful comments, and incredible attention to detail, especially Sean
Hyde, Kolby Cameron, and Katrina Mendoza.
1
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
2
For the purposes of this article, “State” refers to a sovereign whose citizens are
relatively homogenous.
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have within the State court system, and instilling within the State, greater
and more principled acceptance of international legal norms.
I.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

To understand why the United States’ judiciary’s use of
qualified immunity undermines international law, one must first
understand: (a) what qualified immunity is, and (b) how the doctrine’s
expansion over time results in decreased accountability and oversight for
law enforcement. These understandings bring larger arguments about the
undermining of international law and policy into focus.
A. Qualified Immunity as a Law Enforcement Official Legal Defense to
Standing Civil Trial
“Qualified immunity is a defense to standing civil trial” as a law
enforcement official.3 When granted, officials exercising discretionary
functions are given immunity from civil suit in cases dealing with
statutory or constitutional rights violations.4 Law enforcement officials
can raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense at all times when
their actions do not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”5 The doctrine
affords “government officials a ‘margin of error’ to make mistakes in the
course of their work.”6 It also protects their “judgment calls made in a
legally uncertain environment,”7 and intends to protect “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”8
3
Tim Miller, Part IX Qualified Immunity, FLETC,
https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/PartIXQualifiedImmunity.pdf.
4
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226,
233 (7th Cir. 2017); Robbins v. Becker, 715 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Liff v.
Office of Inspector Gen. for U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 881 F.3d 912, 917–18 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(noting that qualified immunity is an entitlement given by the court to not have to stand
trial or face other burdens of litigation); WHITNEY K. NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
LSB10492, POLICING THE POLICE: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
CONGRESS (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10492.
5
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
6
Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2017).
7
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995).
8
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986)); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (quoting Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)); Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty., 871 F.3d
1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1994 (11th Cir.
2002)); West Virginia State Police v. Hughes, 238 W. Va. 406, 411 (2017) (quoting Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)); see also Andrea M. Alonso & Kenneth E. Pitcoff, A
Closer Look at Qualified Immunity, N.Y. L.J. (Jul. 23, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.la
w.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/07/23/a-closer-look-at-qualified-immunity/ (explaining
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B. The Doctrine’s Jurisprudence Results in a Lack of Accountability for
Law Enforcement Officials
Qualified immunity’s evolution over time led to a lack of
accountability for law enforcement officials. This development began
when the Court wished to clarify causes of actions that could be made
against government officials under the Civil Rights Acts of 1871, and its
statutory cause of action, Section 1983.9 The statute and its statutory
cause of action provided people with an avenue to file suit for the
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws” by persons acting “under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.”10
When that person happened to be a law enforcement official, Section
1983, as written by the Congress, allowed civil legal remedies for
individuals to seek legal redress for human right violations recognized
under the Constitution.11 This included the “right to be free from
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment[,]” for example.12 Indeed,
Section 1983 is seen as a “vital component” to redeeming constitutional
guarantees for two reasons.13 Criminal prosecutions of police officers are
scarce, so a plaintiff’s “most plausible avenue for redress [is] often a civil
suit for monetary damages.”14 It also provides a plaintiff with another
avenue for redressability.
Pierson v. Ray was the first time the Court sought to clarify
what causes of action could be made under Section 1983. 15 Pierson
involved an action against city officers and municipal police for false
arrest, imprisonment, and damages for the deprivation of the petitioner’s
civil rights.16 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren expanded
the defense of good faith and probable cause, initially available to
officers in common-law actions for false arrest and imprisonment, to

qualified immunity is not a catchall, and that “it is available to all government officials
except those officers who, on an objective basis, are either ‘plainly incompetent’ or
‘knowingly violates the law.”).
9
NOVAK, supra note 4, at 2.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 4; see also Fourth Amendment, CORNELL LEGAL
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last
visited Mar. 10, 2021) (noting that all searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment
must be reasonable, and that no excessive force shall be used).
13
NOVAK, supra note 4, at 2.
14
Marcus R. Nemeth, How Was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development
of the Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C. L.
REV. 989, 991–92 (2019).
15
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 551 (1967).
16
Id. at 548–50.

MARCH 2021

AMERICAN JUDICIAL REJECTIONISM

401

actions under Section 1983.17 The Court clarified that because there was
no legislative record indicating an intent to abolish such immunities, the
“principle of law” establishing immunities for law enforcement officials,
had not been abolished by Section 1983’s creation.18
Over time, these officer protections expanded.19 Whereas the
Court in Pierson had initially found that qualified immunity applied in
instances where police officers exhibited “good faith” and “probable
cause,” the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald enlarged the standard by
requiring that there be “clearly established” law for the types of
violations committed, to overcome such immunities.20 The Court
reasoned that there should be balance between “the importance of a
damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens” with “the need to
protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official
authority.”21 The Court clarified that its purpose for reaching such
conclusions was to allow “officials to do their jobs and to exercise
judgment, wisdom and sense without worry of being sued.”22 Thus, the
test we see today for qualified immunity was born: when government
officials’ conduct does not amount to a violation of “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights” that a reasonable person would have
known, they are entitled to qualified immunity.23
The doctrine’s expansion serves as a barrier for holding law
enforcement officials accountable because the legal standard, since
Pierson and its progenies, made it more difficult to bring claims against
law enforcement officials as a civil plaintiff.24 The difficulty arises
because the legal standard requires a civil plaintiff to identify not only a
17

Id. at 557.
Id. at 554.
19
Nimra Azmi, The Supreme Court’s Insidious Development of Qualified
Immunity, JUST SECURITY (June 12, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/70751/thesupreme-courts-insidious-development-of-qualified-immunity/ (explaining how since its
inception, “qualified immunity’s protections for officers have only expanded” and that the
doctrine has since grown “as a barrier to justice in . . . intertwined ways.”)
20
Id. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
21
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
22
West Virginia Lottery v. A-1 Amusement, Inc., 807 S.E.2d 760, 776 (2017)
(quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 783 S.E.2d 75, 82 (2015)).
23
Id. See also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (holding that
qualified immunity protects police from civil suit as long as their actions do not “violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”); Nemeth, supra note 14, at 998–99.
24
See Azmi, supra note 19; see JAY SCHEWEIKERT, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY
ANALYSIS NO. 901, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: A LEGAL, PRACTICAL, AND MORAL FAILURE
(Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-09/pa-901-update.pdf
(strongly indicating that the qualified immunity doctrine’s expansion has resulted in a lack
of accountability for law enforcement officials due to its legal standard).
18
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“clear legal rule[,] but a prior case” with identical facts.25 Civil plaintiffs
struggle to show that the law or right was clearly established at the time
the violation was committed.26 This conundrum is due to the United
States’ Supreme Court having not yet clearly defined what it means for
a right to have been “clearly established.”27 Specifically, the doctrine
remains unclear “with respect to the nature of authority required to find
a clearly established right.”28 Instead of providing guidance, the Court
provides vague generalities that “existing precedent should place the
constitutional question ‘beyond debate.’”29
When the Court does provide some guidance, it has been
contradictory.30 At times, the Court paid little attention to the sources of
law, and instead focused on how specifically the right had been
defined.31 In these cases, the Court held that the right must be defined
with enough clarity that a reasonable official would know that what he
or she is doing violated a right.32 At other times, the Court stated that the
facts of a prior case need not be “materially similar,” and that although
the exact action in question does not have to be proved unlawful, prior
existing law should make the unlawfulness of an action apparent.33 Thus,
the degree “to which the specific facts of the violation need to match
25
SCHEWEIKERT, supra note 24 (noting that in practice, the legal standard is a
“huge hurdle for civil plaintiffs because it generally requires them to identify not just a
clear legal rule, but a prior case with functionally identical facts”).
26
James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional
Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602–03 (2011) (stating
that the lack of accountability stems from the inability to meet such a demanding standard
to overcome such immunities awarded to law enforcement officials).
27
Id. John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295,
1298–99 (2012) (describing how the Supreme Court has not given a definition of what it
means for rights to have been “clearly established”).
28
Tyler Finn, Qualified Immunity Formalism: ‘Clearly Established Law’ and the
Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 450 (2019).
29
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (holding that plaintiffs seeking
to overcome qualified immunity are required to present “existing precedent” that places
the legal question “beyond debate”); see also Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015);
Finn supra note 28, at 450.
30
Williams, supra note 27, at 1305.
31
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2018) (clarifying that lower courts
should not read precedent broadly when determining if new facts should be governed by
clearly established law); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (noting
that whether facts fall into the “clearly established” standard requires a “high ‘degree of
specificity’”); see Finn supra note 28, at 451 (explaining how the “Supreme Court has
concentrated little attention on the relevant sources of law, instead focusing its holding on
the specificity with which the right must be defined”).
32
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741; see Finn
supra note 28, at 451 (emphasizing how the Supreme Court has looked for the invoked
right to have been “defined with sufficient clarity so a reasonable official would understand
that what she is doing violates that right”).
33
Finn, supra note 28, at 452.
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existing precedent” is unclear.34 The inconsistency is problematic
because it continues to present difficulties for lower courts who are
responsible for initially determining what “clearly established” law is for
rights.35 This, in turn, results in an ambiguous standard.
Because of the lack of clarity in the standard, the doctrine in
practice protects law enforcement officials from even getting to trial.36
Judges, in their “arbitrary degree of factual specificity in making that
judgment . . . ultimately leave the protections afforded by important
rights unpredictable”37 and err on the side of granting rather than denying
qualified immunity. In other words, the expansive judicial discretion
self-created by the decreased uniformity of qualified immunity rulings
results in more protections for police and decreased protections for
plaintiffs whose rights have been violated.38 Moreover, deciding cases in
this discretionary way leaves certain constitutional analysis unaddressed,
which means the law is never left clear, never grows, and stalls.39 This
stalling leaves civil plaintiffs without a remedy for the violation of their
rights.40 As Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion notes in Kisela, this
approach towards qualified immunity “transforms the doctrine into an
absolute shield for law enforcement officers” and is “symptomatic of ‘a
disturbing trend regarding the use of the Court’s resources’ in qualified
immunity cases.”41 Indeed, a Reuters study confirms not only the
growing inclination of the appellate courts to grant police immunity but
also large geographical disparities in the rate that officers receive
immunity.42

34

Id.
Id.
See Nemeth, supra note 14, at 992.
37
Aaron Belzer, The Audacity of Ignoring Hope: How the Existing Qualified
Immunity Analysis Leads to Unremedied Rights, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 647, 647 (2012).
38
Williams, supra note 27, at 1299; Belzer, supra note 37.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
42
Reuter’s analysis found notable distinctions in how district court judges in two
different states ruled on qualified immunity requests. For instance, Texas judges granted
immunity more frequently to officers who used force against unarmed civilians than
California judges did in cases where civilians were armed. Andrea Januta & Jackie Botts,
Taking the Measure of Qualified Immunity: How Reuters Analyzed the Data, REUTERS
(Dec. 23, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usapolice-immunity-methodology/.
35
36
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS ON
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
The ICCPR, the UNCAT, and the ICERD, set out legal
standards applicable to both policing and the fundamental rights of an
individual for States to observe. In addition, practical guidance
developed by international organizations—like the UNODC—is given
to support States like the United States, in an endeavor to provide
transparency, accountability, and oversight in policing, as specific to
disciplinary proceedings against law enforcement officials. To better
understand the drawn connection, one need first know what the
aforementioned treaties represent and the United States’ role in the
treaties. Similarly, practical guidance as carried out by UNODC must
first be illustrated in order to bring forth the connection that this article
presents.
A. International Legal Obligations Under the ICCPR, UNCAT,
and the ICERD
In the international human rights arena, there are three treaties
of notable importance that set out guiding principles on the fundamental
rights of a person for ratifying States to observe and that are particularly
undermined by the U.S. judiciary’s creation and practice of the qualified
immunity doctrine: the ICCPR,43 the UNCAT,44 and the ICERD.45
Subject to RUDs,46 ratifying States are bound by the respective treaty
provisions.47
1. The ICCPR Guarantees Right to Effective Remedy for Civil
Rights Violations. — The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty adopted by the
United Nations Assembly that commits its parties to respect an
individual’s civil and political rights, including the right to life, human
dignity, and freedom from torture.48 Imbedded into the treaty is the
43

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture (Dec. 10, 1984).
45
G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965).
46
RUDs are attachments to treaties that explain how a treaty will be interpreted
with a State’s domestic law once ratification is complete. RUDs limit the domestic effect
of treaties and reframe certain provisions from the treaties in ways that make it consistent
with American practices. Eric Chung, The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of
Treaty Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 126 YALE L.J. 170, 170 (2016).
47
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States sets
out basic principles of how customary law should be incorporated into the “law of the land”
under Article IV of the Constitution. As the Court holds, “international law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
48
G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 43, pmbl.
44
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guaranteed right to due process and a fair trial when those rights have
been violated.49
The ICCPR establishes an international legal framework for a
right to remedy, wherein the covenant compels ratifying State
governments to take judicial measures in order to protect the rights
afforded in the treaty provisions and allows for effective remedies to
ensue.50 As stated more specifically in the ICCPR, ratifying States need
to have an adequate process in place, by which people can seek redress
if their civil or political rights have been violated.51 Notably, each State
Party shoulders a burden:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms
as herein recognized are violated shall have an
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial, administrative or legislature authorities, or by
any other competent authority provided for by the
legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall
enforce such remedies when granted.52
In 1992, the United States Senate ratified the ICCPR.53 As a result, the
ICCPR effectively became the “supreme law of the land” and now
carries the weight of federal law in the United States.54 In carrying this
status, the ICCPR obligates the United States to protect basic human
rights including in instances where government entities and agents are
involved.55 To that end, the covenant compels the United States’
government to take judicial measures towards protecting the rights listed
in the treaty’s provisions and to provide an effective remedy when those

49

Id. pt. 2, art. 2.
FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, ACLU (Apr. 2019),
https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr.
51
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY, OVERSIGHT, AND INTEGRITY, at 21, U.N. Sales No. E.11.IV.5 (2011),
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_police_Accountability_Overs
ight_and_Integrity.pdf.
52
G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 43, pt. 2, art. 2, ¶ 3.
53
ACLU, supra note 50.
54
Id.
55
Id.
50
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rights have been violated.56 Subject to RUDs made at the time of
ratifying the ICCPR, the United States cannot take measures that
contradict or violate such provisions.57
Here, it is important to note that at the time of U.S. ratification
of the ICCPR, there was a RUD rendering the treaty non-selfexecuting.58 This RUD, in effect, limits litigants’ ability to sue in court
for direct enforcement of the treaty provisions.59 Despite this, the United
States is still obligated to uphold the object and purpose of the ratified
treaty.60
2. Right to Prompt and Impartial Investigations, and Fair and
Adequate Compensation under the UNCAT. — The UNCAT is a human
rights treaty with the objective to help eliminate cruel, inhumane
treatment across the international community.61 This treaty is applicable
to policing, specifically in terms of policing behavior (like torture).62
UNCAT requires its signatories to take effective measures to avoid
torture and other acts of cruel or inhuman treatment within their
jurisdiction.63 Upon the State’s ratification, it must ensure that when
there is inhumane treatment in violation of the treaty’s provisions, it is
made possible for an individual to initiate and proceed with a prompt and
impartial investigation in the State.64 Specifically, Article 12 and 13
obligate the ratifying State to ensure competent authorities promptly and
impartially investigate, when there is reasonable belief that an act of
torture has occurred in its jurisdiction.65 Article 14 obligates the State
party to ensure redress in its legal system for an act of torture.66 This
includes providing “an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation” and in the event of the victim’s death “as a result of
torture, his [or her] dependents shall be entitled to compensation.”67
Upon United States ratification in October 1994, the UNCAT
became binding in the United States, consequentially expanding its
56

Id.
Id.
S. Res. 95-20, 102d Cong., 138 Cong. Rec. S478-01 (1992) (enacted).
59
ACLU, supra note 50.
60
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (A “State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty”).
61
U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to
Interrogation, EVERYCRSREPORT.COM (Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
reports/RL32438.html.
62
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 51, at 21.
63
G.A. Res. 39/46, supra note 44.
64
Id. arts. 12–13.
65
Id.
66
Id. art. 14.
67
Id.
57
58
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application to all actions in the State, notably, actions involving
“government entities and agents,” down to the state and local level.68 In
effect, the Convention applies to police departments and other law
enforcement agencies.69 Though, in similar fashion to the ICCPR, the
United States Senate, at the time of ratification, submitted a declaration,
rendering the previously mentioned treaty provisions non-selfexecuting.70
3. The Ratifying State’s Obligation to Review Governmental
Policies that Perpetuate Racial Discrimination under ICERD. — The
ICERD is a convention that commits its signatories to the elimination of
racial discrimination and sets forth principles by which signatories can
work to eliminate racial discrimination.71 Notably, State parties
guarantee that they will “take effective measures to review
governmental, national, and local policies, and amend, rescind, or nullify
any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or
perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.”72 Moreover, State
parties shall ensure to those in their jurisdiction effective remedy
procedures.73
Upon ratification of the ICERD in 1994, the United States
committed itself to upholding equality and non-discrimination in the
criminal legal system, and access to justice.74 Similar to the ICCPR and
UNCAT, the ICERD provisions apply to “government entities and
agents, including all federal, state, city, and county and all forms of local
government entities” in the United States.75 Further, the ICERD carries
the same weight as federal law, subject to RUDs filed at the time of
ratification.76 Similar to the RUDs filed upon the ratification of the
ICCPR and UNCAT, the United States declared the ICERD treaty to be

68
FAQ: The Convention Against Torture, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-convention-against-torture.
69
Id.
70
S. Res. 100-20, 101st Cong., 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (1990) (enacted).
71
G.A. Res. 2106, supra note 45.
72
Id. art. 2, pt. 1(c).
73
Id. art. 6.
74
The United States commits itself to upholding ICERD’s treaty provisions upon
ratification. Though, the State has fallen short due to nullifying RUDs. Maya K. Watson,
The United States’ Hollow Commitment to Eradicating Global Racial Discrimination, AM.
B. ASS’N (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_ri
ghts_magazine_home/black-to-the-future-part-ii/the-united-states--hollow-commitmentto-eradicating-global-racia/.
75
Frequently Asked Questions Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ce
rd_faqs.pdf (last visited Feb 19, 2021).
76
Id.

408

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 2

non-self-executing upon ratification.77 In the same vein, this prevents
litigants from bringing ICERD claims into U.S. courts.78
B. International Policies on Police Accountability
In the policing arena, the United Nations has been anything but
silent about the need for criminal legal system reform. Notably, the
United Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights led efforts to
address systemic racism against African American individuals by
adopting resolutions to condemn racial discrimination and violent
practice at the hands of law enforcement.79 Moreover, throughout the
years, the United Nations and other international organizations created
standards for countries to use as a way to hold police officers more
accountable in the context of disciplinary proceedings initiated against
them. The intention is to assist policymakers and key players within the
State in helping to improve, promote and protect human rights at the
domestic level.80 In the context of policing, these sort of standards,
guidelines, and norms projected by the international community serve as
readymade tools for States across the globe by which accountability can
be reinforced in their jurisdictions.81
1. International Standards and Practices Specific to
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Police Officers. — At its core,
international norms involving disciplinary proceedings against police
officers communicate a need for States to respect and protect human
rights. Narrowing into what exactly this entails, State police overseers
have to be willing to hold police accountable. With this form of
accountability “disrespect must be followed by appropriate disciplinary
proceedings.”82 In other words, there must be a willingness to provide
individuals with certain protections, which include disciplinary
proceedings when violations have occurred. Specifically, these
proceedings should not be limited to criminal proceedings, but should
include both “civil and public administrative proceedings for
compensation or redress.”83 Notably, international standards for policing
include the ability for a fair trial to be conducted, where there is the
77
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“disclosing [of] dockets and other pieces of work-related information
that may be self-incriminating.”84 In situations where “the complainant
is injured, or the victim has died as a result of police action, the burden
of proof falls on the police to explain” how this happened.85
This becomes especially important in the context of policing
where “successful civil suits filed by victims [become] a critical tool for
police departments to identify and remedy widespread abuses” in a way
that criminal charges against police officers cannot.86 Indeed, the
UNODC emphasized the usefulness of a complainant filing a civil suit
against the police officer or police agency accused of misconduct.87
UNODC reasoned that it is a better accountability mechanism than
existing police accountability systems, as civil litigation is historically a
strong deterrent against future violations.88
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE UNDERMINES INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLICY, COMPROMISING ACCOUNTABILITY
Despite the law and policy put into place by the international
community, the United States judicially created qualified immunity
doctrine for law enforcement officials undermines the measures meant
to secure law enforcement accountability. Although domestic courts in
the State are not obligated to enforce treaties that are bound to non-selfexecuting RUDs or pay mind to what the international community offers
as “advice” about domestic affairs,89 creating this form of domestic court
precedent poses bigger challenges to the treaty making process’s
legitimacy and it feeds into a system wherein State domestic court
systems are held less accountable to treaties the State itself ratified.
A. The Lack of Clarity Found in the Doctrine Undermines International
Law and Policy.
As discussed in Part I, the highest court in the United States has
never given a clear definition of what it means for a right to be “clearly
established,”90 which has resulted in a lack of accountability for law
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enforcement officials.91 This lack of accountability, whether intentional
or not, undermines and rejects international law and policy that requires
a State to hold law enforcement officials accountable after a human
rights violation occurs in its territory.
The ICCPR provides for an individual’s right to effective
remedy after a civil or political rights violation occurs in the ratifying
State.92 However, a State domestic court system undermines such State
obligations when it creates doctrines like qualified immunity, which
compromises the State’s obligation of “ensur[ing] that any person whose
civil rights or freedoms are violated[,] have an effective remedy,” and
that said remedy is guaranteed and enforced by judicial authorities.93
Although the ICCPR does not explicitly consider civil legal redress to be
a sign of ensuring effective remedy, it is arguable that not having civil
legal redress in the United States compromises remedies’ adequacy and
effectiveness. In the United States, police officer criminal prosecutions
are scarce and a plaintiff’s “most plausible avenue for redress often is
civil suit for monetary damages.”94 Thus, by limiting avenues for civil
remedy as a result of the difficult standard that must be met to surpass
qualified immunity, there are functionally no options in remedy.
Similarly, the qualified immunity doctrine undermines
provisions under the UNCAT that guarantee an individual’s right to
prompt and impartial investigations, and fair and adequate compensation
in the United States when acts of cruel, inhuman treatment are exhibited
by law enforcement officials.95 There is a lack of prompt and impartial
investigations when a State domestic court doctrine limits the ability for
an officer to even stand civil suit in the first place. This practice hinders
both the ability to promptly redress violations against victims and
judicial impartiality, by wielding vague legal standards to dismiss a civil
case without having to analyze its implications. Moreover, the qualified
immunity doctrine rejects much of the language in Article 14 which
ensures that ratifying States provide redress for an act of torture and that
a plaintiff have an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.96
This is because the doctrine’s application limits the ability to seek civil
damages against officers who may have exercised cruel and inhuman
treatment against an individual.
The doctrine also undermines ICERD provisions that speak to
amending, rescinding or nullifying laws that have the effect of creating
91
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or perpetuating racial discrimination.97 The doctrine in itself perpetuates
egregious and racist conduct exercised by police officers because its
standard makes it almost impossible to sue a police officer for damages.98
In short, international standards and practice specific to
disciplinary proceedings against law enforcement officials are also
undermined when State domestic court doctrine ignores the need for civil
suits and standards in disciplinary proceedings.
As noted in Part II, international organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UNODC
suggest that there be civil proceedings for redress because of civil
litigation’s ability to serve as a strong deterrent against future
violations.99 Civil suits serve as a uniquely strong deterrent for a few
reasons. First, litigation through Section 1983 tends to be “the only legal
tool that is available to reach the nearly 18,000 police departments
nationwide.”100 Second, civil suits against police officers are vital
because modern discovery allows for information accumulation that can
then be assessed “for trends . . . suggesting problem officers, units and
practices.”101 In the same way, one could also review evidence developed
through case law “for personnel and policy lessons.”102
However, the qualified immunity doctrine undermines these
processes by preventing cases from ever coming to court. As a result, the
doctrine’s limitations do not pay enough attention to international policy
stressing the importance for civil suits against police officers. Thus, the
doctrine undermines international standards and norms that call for fair
trials outside of criminal proceedings against law enforcement
officials.103 This includes a means for disclosure of self-incriminating
information,104 an ability for an accurate balancing of evidence,105 and
the burden falling on the law enforcement officials to explain how the
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violation might have occurred.106 The U.S. judiciary’s rejectionism in
this way fails to acknowledge the advice given by international
organizations, like ICRC and UNODC, that there is value in the ability
to file civil suit against a law enforcement official. If there were an honest
acknowledgement of such international policies, the U.S. judiciary
would not make it so difficult to sue a law enforcement official in a noncriminal proceeding.
B. U.S. Rejectionism Delegitimizes the Treaty-making Process, and
Results in a Lack of Accountability
As noted, State domestic courts are not obligated to enforce
treaties that are bound to non-self-executing RUDs,107 nor are States
obligated to follow advice given by the international community.
However, this does not stop domestic disregard of international law and
policy through court precedent from being unimportant. Creating
domestic court precedent that undermines international law and policy
delegitimizes the treaty making process and further perpetuates the
notion that State domestic courts need not give credence to international
law the State itself ratified.
Of course, international human rights law must be delicately
balanced with sovereignty principles, especially in cases where
sovereignty principles are exercised through the State domestic court
system.108 However, State domestic court rejectionist policy that
undermines international law meant to combat a lack of accountability
for law enforcement officials ends up incapacitating treaties the U.S.
signs and ratifies. International treaties are built on shared interests, trust
and are meant to promote greater cooperation among States.109 In other
words, State parties to an international treaty are supposed to have
greater confidence that the terms to which they have agreed are followed
by other State parties signing on.110 Therefore, when domestic court
precedent undermines such provisions, built confidence and trust
established among signatories is jeopardized. Such undermining also
presents larger issues regarding the treaty-making process’s legitimacy
and what it means for there to be international law if such undermining,
whether intentional or not, is permitted by the State’s branches of
government.
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Further, allowing State domestic court systems to create a
doctrine that rejects or disregards international law feeds into a larger
problem. Namely, State domestic courts do not have to enforce treaty
provisions the State itself ratifies due to federalism principles.
Federalism principles rely on the notion that it is the legislature’s job to
implement the provisions of the treaty before it may be applied by the
courts.111 However, what is actually created is a State domestic court
system that not only reverts to “local and regional human rights norms
and institutions over international ones,” but also creates precedent that
undermines international laws that the State opted to be held accountable
to.112
IV. RESOLUTIONS
Recommendations to combat instances where a State domestic
court system creates doctrine that undermines international law and
policy include the development of greater and more principled
acceptance of international human right legal obligations and norms by
domestic courts. The first specific suggestion broadly considers limiting
the use of RUDs, so as to not restrict the domestic effect of treaties like
the ICCPR, the UNCAT, and ICERD within the State court system. The
second suggestion considers reforming a specific type of RUD: non-selfexecuting declarations, so that treaties like the ICCPR, the UNCAT, and
ICERD can be acknowledged and enforced in domestic courts. A last
recommendation calls for greater State recognition and integration of
norms set forth by international communities.
A. Reforming RUDs to Counteract U.S. Judiciary Rejectionist Policy
Considering an appropriate use of RUDs is a positive step
towards limiting cases where the State’s domestic court system may be
more inclined to create policy that undermines international law, whether
explicitly or not.
RUDs lay out how a treaty will be interpreted under a State’s
laws,113 as they are attachments put on an international treaty that clarify
how the respective treaty will be interpreted in the ratifying State.114 In
other words, RUDs are a way for States to qualify their consent to a
111

Vasquez, supra note 89.
Jack Goldsmith, The Unexceptional U.S. Rights RUDs, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
311, 312 (2005).
113
Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 99–122 (1996).
114
Id. Common Grounder, Do Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations in
a Treaty Have Legal Weight?, WE CAN DO THIS IF WE TRY (Oct. 12, 2013, 1:49 PM),
http://wecandothisifwetry.blogspot.com/2013/10/do-reservations-understandingsand.html.
112

414

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 2

particular treaty.115 In some ways, they can be seen as a State, at the
outset, rejecting particular provisions of the treaty and usurping the
treaty’s law for a State’s domestic needs.116 It also seems to set a tone in
the tension that exists between State sovereignty and “the notion of
international order based on law.”117
In the United States, RUDs are adopted by the Senate when it
consents to the treaty and are included when the President decides to
ratify the treaty.118 Due to RUDs’ ability to void States’ obligations under
provisions within treaties, international law scholars raise the concern
that RUDs get in the way of “an international order that seeks to
encourage genuine and full treaty participation” by the State as a
whole.119 Indeed, supporters of ratification view certain aspects of RUDs
as warping the treatymaking process under the United States
Constitution to the point of even reinvigorating the Bricker
Amendment—which, if adopted, would have wreaked damage on treaty
power by making all treaties not self-executing.120
Consequently, RUDs should be limited. Treaty drafters should
disallow RUDs and instead include no-reservation clauses and/or
provisions limiting the use of RUDs.121 This would make the State more
accountable to the obligations listed within the provisions of a treaty. To
be clear, there are cases where limiting RUDs will not be possible. 122 In
those cases, the United States should not ratify the treaty.123 Instead the
United States should consider whether or not it should even sign onto
such a treaty in the first place, and thereby risk violating the “object and
purpose” of the treaty’s enactment.124 Limiting the broad overuse of
RUDs may then be able to reorient the tone that the U.S. customarily
projects when it comes to meaningfully upholding treaty mandates.125
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More importantly, limiting RUDs in this way might rebuild sentiment
within the United States government, including the State’s domestic
court system, when it comes to paying mind to international law and
policy because the State would only be signing treaties it is truly
committed to upholding.
The possibility of limiting RUDs is not so far out of reach. The
Senate push backed against limiting RUDs, due to the Senate’s obvious
need to conform international law to the Constitution.126 However, the
Senate has given consent to treaties that carry RUD limiting provisions
although clarifying that their approval should “not be construed as
precedent for such clauses in future agreements.”127 This suggests that
progress can be made towards limiting the practice of RUDs.
This article is not denying the possibility that this shift might
make the United States reconsider signing onto treaties altogether.128 The
United States has a history of being reluctant participation in multilateral
treaties, unless significant reservations to the treaty can be attached. 129
Examples include referring back to the ICCPR, UNCAT, and ICERD,
where the United States attached reservations in all three treaties that
effectively excluded State’s domestic courts from enforcing the treaty’s
provisions.130 Additionally, when the United States became a party to the
ICCPR, the State attached reservations that excluded U.S. obligations
under the treaty that added to already-existing U.S. law.131
There is also the possibility that other State actors might
determine “the United States’ use of RUDs in important treaties more
inappropriate and its ratification less important.”132 In this case, treaty
drafters might be more willing to pass treaties with these sorts of
provisions that limit RUDs and leave “the United States behind in the
treatymaking process.”133 This means that other members of the
international community might start creating RUD-limiting treaties that
prevent the United States from joining if the United States
“unnecessarily concerns itself with the enforceability of its RUDs.”134
Indeed, treaties have no sign of slowing anytime soon, and in instances
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where the United States ratifies less treaties, other states will continue
signing and ratifying multilateral treaties without the United States.135
B. Rethinking RUD Non-Self-Executing Declarations
The United States’ practice of declaring treaties non-selfexecuting via RUDs notably contributes to judicial rejectionist policy, as
non-self-executing declarations mean that legislative action is required
before it may be applied by the courts.136 Without legislative action then,
non-self-executing treaties are seen as a way for domestic courts to
disregard treaties the State itself ratifies, which further perpetuates
sentiment that United States domestic courts find no need to take human
rights treaties seriously.137 Most importantly, it allows domestic courts
to create doctrines that undermines international legal obligations. In
order to combat or limit such practices non-self-executing declarations
should be reformed dramatically.
Notably, non-self-executing declarations are among the most
important forms of RUDs, largely due to their remarkable ability to
render human rights treaties unenforceable by domestic courts.138 As
previously mentioned, this is because these declarations make it so that
a treaty is only enforceable in State domestic courts if the United States’
political branches act to make it so.139 Thus, this sort of RUD alleviates
domestic courts from obligations tied to the provisions of a given treaty,
and instead, punts the “task of implementing human rights obligations
into domestic law” to the other branches of State government.140
Proponents of such practices cite that political branches have a
legitimate need in preserving the domestic implementation of such
treaties, and that the power over the conduct of U.S. foreign relations
should be left to the political branches.141 However, such propositions
are one-dimensional since they fail to acknowledge that all branches of
the United States government should be accountable to internationally
recognized and binding law and should act accordingly because treaties
enjoy the benefit of the Supremacy Clause. One cannot be accountable
to a treaty’s provisions if there is no power to uphold or enforce it. An
attachment to the treaty’s ratification should not dramatically change it
135
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in this way. Instead, domestic courts should be empowered to uphold the
supreme law of the land, which is what a treaty becomes upon
ratification. This is important, as all branches should be accountable to
the law and play an active role in upholding it, not just two of three
branches of the government.
Moreover, international law scholars with federalism sympathy
disregard that when one branch of government fails to act, the other must
hold that branch accountable. Concerns over judicial activism are
welcome, but one must also acknowledge the need for judicial oversight
due to the separation of power principles. Domestic courts must have the
ability to hold other branches of government accountable should those
branches decide not to enforce and uphold treaty provisions the State
itself committed to upholding. To do otherwise risks compromising the
people’s will, whose rights, as prescribed under treaties, are actively
violated. Alternatively, one must consider the point of ratifying the treaty
in the first place.
C. State Recognition and Integration of International Norms as a
Means of Combatting Judicial Rejectionism
A final recommendation calls for wider acceptance of
international norms and standards put into place by international
organizations involving domestic affairs, such as policing. In theory, this
would encourage greater domestic court recognition and aid in curbing
domestic court precedent that undermines and discredits such standards
and norms.
1. What Are International Organizations and Why Are They
Important? — International organizations serve many functions,
including gathering information, monitoring trends, delivering services
and aid, and providing forums for States to work together to achieve
common objectives.142 Relevant to this discussion, international
organizations, typically created by treaty,143 involve multiple nations,
working in “good faith, on issues of common interest.”144 Because the
scale of problems States face might be too great to confront alone,
international organizations, such as the UNODC, offer assistance and
encourage cross-national approaches to action involving domestic issues
142
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such as policing.145 Efforts through international organizations create
systems that bring nations “together in the areas of peace and
security.”146 This strengthens charity and clears the way for “equitable
distribution of [international] resources in the world.”147 These resources
include manuals from experts such as “police officers, members of
independent oversight bodies, international consultants, human right
activists, and academics.”148 In the policing arena, these efforts provide
“a system of internal and external checks and balances” to make sure law
enforcement officials carry out their duties properly and are held
responsible when they do not.149
2. Why listen? — The big question that seems to follow is why
the United States—specifically the United States judiciary—would want
to listen, when it already has a tough time listening to loud and articulate
voices that define problems and potential solutions within its
jurisdiction. The answer might be that there is more to be gained than
lost. Specifically, international standards and norms have the ability to
shift the way the United States judiciary thinks about its own legal
interpretation, especially with respect to qualified immunity. As
associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice
Breyer, notes, “forces of globalism, internationalism, and
interdependence” and “forces of localism” need not be “antithetical to”
one another.150 They can coexist, and both can be accounted for.151 As
Justice Breyer further suggests, “look[ing] beyond [your] own shores” is
needed “to answer questions of local law,”152 even for questions of local
law that might involve domestic affairs, such as policing.
CONCLUSION
Whether doctrines at the State domestic judicial level can
continue undermining and rejecting international law and policy remains
central to the future of treatymaking. The doctrine examined here,
qualified immunity, has undermined the ICCPR, the UNCAT, the
ICERD, and international policy by international organizations.
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The ICCPR does not specifically prescribe civil legal redress as
an effective remedy that must be met by the ratifying State. However, in
a State where criminal prosecutions of police officers are scarce, like the
United States, difficulties to seek civil legal redress compromise the
treaties provisions guaranteeing an effective remedy for victims.
Much in the same way, the qualified immunity doctrine also
undermines provisions under the UNCAT, which guarantee prompt and
impartial investigations and fair and adequate compensation in the
ratifying State when law enforcement officials have exercised cruel and
inhuman treatment against an individual. This is because the doctrine
limits law enforcement officials from even being sued civilly.
Qualified immunity also undermines ICERD provisions that
speak to reforming laws that have the effect of perpetuating racial
discrimination. It perpetuates racist conduct by law enforcement officials
because the standards for overcoming qualified immunity are so difficult
to meet.
Likewise, the qualified immunity doctrine undermines
international norms as it limits proceedings that are not criminal in nature
and disregards the importance of civil proceedings.
If rejectionism by the United States’ highest court continues,
the treatymaking process stands to lose more than mere participation; it
stands to lose weight and credibility. Future promises by the State will
lack credibility, making it increasingly difficult to recapture the
investment made as a ratifying State. Further, rejectionist practices will
continue to encourage a system where State domestic courts do not have
to enforce provisions of treaties that the State itself ratified. Further,
RUDs in these treaties enable judicial rejectionism, relieves the judiciary
from accountability, and endorses a branch of government’s ability to
create law that undermines international law. This article adds a new
dimension to that debate by examining how the United States’ highest
court carries out rejectionist policy through the continual use of the
qualified immunity doctrine, something seemingly domestic and far
removed from international law and policy. Consequently, qualified
immunity carries much more broad and far-reaching implications to the
State’s ability to ratify international treaties and a State judiciary’s ability
to undermine said treaties.
The future of treaty making is ultimately left in the hands of the
United States and its allies. Reforming RUDs to not limit treaties’
domestic effects within the State court system and instilling within the
State greater and more principled acceptance of international legal norms
has the ability to help lead a reoriented effort that sustain treatymaking’s
values.

